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21. Introduction
For several decades, in both the marketing and economics professions, substantial ef-
fort has been devoted toward achieving a better understanding of the relationship be-
tween prices, advertising expenditures and product quality. A voluminous literature has
emerged that includes a variety of empirical and theoretical approaches. Contributions
representative of the theoretical approaches and containing discussions of empirical mat-
ter include Kirmani & Rao (2000) and Hertzendorf & Overgaard (2001). A survey of
the empirical and theoretical studies of advertising is provided by Bagwell (2005).
Beginning with Nelson (1970, 1974), a large proportion of the contributions appear-
ing over the past thirty years have viewed the relationship through a signaling lens. The
basic idea is that price and/or advertising intensity may serve as signals of unobservable
product quality. Some of the main insights can be understood in terms of a two-phase
signaling framework, in which a monopolist provides a new product of either low or
high quality that passes through an introductory phase, in which signaling occurs, and
a mature phase, in which consumers are informed of product quality. A key assumption
is that the high-quality product has a higher marginal cost of production; for exam-
ple, a high-quality product may require more expensive raw materials. A high-quality
monopolist then ﬁnds a lower sales volume relatively more attractive than would a low-
quality monopolist. Consequently, in the introductory phase, a high-quality monopolist
may signal quality with a high price that exceeds the complete-information monopoly
price. Likewise, if advertising enhances demand, then a high-quality producer may also
signal quality by using a low level of advertising that is below the complete-information
monopoly advertising level.1 Once the mature phase is reached, consumers know quality,
and so signaling is no longer required. In the mature phase, the high-quality monop-
olist thus selects its complete-information monopoly price and advertising levels. A
low-quality monopolist, by contrast, selects its complete-information monopoly price
and advertising levels in both the introductory and mature phases.
The two-phase signaling framework implies that the price-quality relationship weak-
ens over time, since the high-quality monopolist distorts its price upward (i.e., selects
a supra-monopoly price) in the introductory phase and then reduces its price to the
complete-information monopoly level in the mature phase. Bagwell & Riordan (1991)
establish this prediction in a model in which the monopolist can use only price to signal
quality.2 Overgaard (1991, Ch. 2) shows that the prediction is maintained when adver-
1In this framework, if advertising is dissipative, then it is not used as a signal in the introductory
period. See Overgaard (1991, Ch. 2) and Bagwell (2005, Section 6.1). We focus here on demand-
enhancing advertising.
2See Bagwell (1991, 1992) for extensions that allow for endogenous quality, general demand functions
and product lines.
3tising is also available as a signal.3 As Overgaard shows, a high-quality monopolist also
distorts downward the level of demand-enhancing advertising in the introductory phase.
It follows that a high-quality monopolist increases its demand-enhancing advertising as
the product moves into the mature phase, and the advertising-quality relationship thus
strengthens over time. An immediate but important implication of the framework is
thus that price and advertising move in opposite directions over time, when quality is
high. Bagwell (2005, Section 6.1) provides further analysis of the two-phase signaling
framework and the relationship of its predictions to existing empirical ﬁndings.
Consider now the relationship between advertising and quality. Is it positive or
negative? In other words, would a high-quality monopolist advertise at a greater or lower
level than a low-quality monopolist? And does the relationship between advertising and
quality depend on whether the product is in the introductory or mature phase? These
are fundamental questions for the literature that analyzes advertising as a signal of
quality. In particular, answers to these questions would provide testable predictions as
to the sign of the correlation between advertising and quality. It is therefore somewhat
surprising that existing work does not oﬀer general answers to these questions.
Upon further reﬂection, however, it is easy to why such answers are not easily ob-
tained. When demand and marginal cost both rise with quality, it is not immediately
clear whether the complete-information monopoly advertising level rises or falls with
quality. On the one hand, the assumption that marginal cost rises with quality suggests
that the complete-information monopoly advertising level may fall with quality; on the
other hand, if the marginal eﬀect of advertising on demand is greater for a high-quality
product, then the complete-information monopoly advertising level may rise with qual-
ity. Suppose ﬁrst that the complete-information monopoly advertising level falls with
quality. In this case, since the high-quality monopolist distorts advertising downward in
the introductory period, it follows immediately that the advertising-quality relationship
is negative in the introductory and mature phases. Second, suppose that the complete-
information monopoly advertising level rises with quality. The advertising-quality rela-
tionship is then positive in the mature phase; however, the sign of the relationship is
ap r i o r iambiguous in the introductory phase. Intuitively, the high-quality monopolist
distorts downward its advertising selection, but this downward distortion is relative to
ah i g h e rs t a r t i n gp o i n t .
In this paper, we make two main contributions. First, we oﬀer further support for the
predictions that the price-quality relationship weakens over time while the advertising-
quality relationship strengthens over time. Our analysis includes a wide range of de-
mand functions; for example, we study signaling behavior when advertising plays an
informative role by expanding the size of the market, and also when advertising plays
3For related methods, see Bagwell & Ramey (1988), who consider price and advertising as joint
signals of cost in a model of limit pricing. See also Zhao (2000).
4a persuasive role by raising the valuations that consumers have for the product. Sec-
ond, and most importantly, we ﬁnd that, for a wide range of demand functions, the
relationship between advertising and quality in the introductory phase is negative.I n
other words, whether or not a high-quality monopolist would advertise more than a
low-quality monopolist in a complete-information setting, we establish the novel ﬁnd-
ing that the high-quality monopolist selects a lower level of advertising than would a
low-quality monopolist in the introductory phase. Our analysis thus oﬀers support for
the hypothesis that the advertising-quality correlation is negative in the introductory
phase and becomes less negative or even positive in the mature phase.
To develop these ﬁndings, we analyze a static signaling game. The game has a
monopolist who is privately informed of the quality of its product, which is high or
low. The monopolist then selects a price and a level of demand-enhancing advertising.
Consumers observe the price and advertising levels, form beliefs as to product quality,
and then demand the corresponding units from the monopolist. In terms of the two-
phase signaling framework described above, the static signaling game fully captures the
introductory phase of the product. Since proﬁts in the mature phase are independent of
introductory-phase selections, we need not explicitly model the mature phase. Instead,
we proceed with the understanding that price and advertising levels would be set at
their complete-information levels, once the mature phase is reached. This approach
seems reasonable if the introductory and mature phases are regarded as periods in the
product’s life cycle that are suﬃciently far apart. Our approach would be less compelling
if we were interested in adjacent periods within a broader introductory phase, since in
this case the interaction between price, advertising and repeat-purchase dynamics would
be of central importance.4
Our work relates to previous empirical and theoretical work. As summarized by
Bagwell (2005, Section 3.2.5), empirical analyses of the advertising-quality relationship
do not oﬀer strong support for the hypothesis of a systematic, positive relationship
between advertising and quality. Work by Tellis and Fornell (1988), however, suggests
4Thus, we essentially follow the tradition of the signaling literature by directly assuming away signal-
ing over several periods, when separation of types can be accomplished in one go. Recently, Kaya (2005)
has shown how distributing the signal (hence, the costly distortion) over several periods may be cost-
eﬀective for the strong (high-quality) type and, thus, associated with least-cost separating equilibria.
Technically, the reasons are similar to why a Sender may chose to signal in several dimensions (e.g., price,
advertising and warranty) when one (say, price) is enough. Increasing the dimensionality of the signal
space (whether temporally or in Euclidean fashion) may eﬀectively weaken the incentive pressure from
weak types. Hence, high-dimensional signals will tend to be favored by standard equilibrium-selection
techniques. See also Bagwell & Riordan’s (1991) analysis of the “hindsighted consumer” model. There,
a new consumer uses the monopolist’s current and past prices when forming beliefs as to product quality,
and in the least-cost separating equilibrium the monopolist may “front load” the signaling process (i.e.,
select a very high price in the introductory period) in order to enjoy a more proﬁtable price in the later
period.
5that the advertising-quality relationship strengthens as products mature. This is broadly
consistent with the ﬁndings reported here. Recent work by Horstmann and MacDonald
(2003) is of particular interest. They study the compact disc player market. Using panel
data on advertising and pricing during 1983-92 and controlling for product features, ﬁrm
heterogeneity and aggregate eﬀects, they provide evidence that advertising increases
after a disc player is introduced, while price moves in the opposite direction and falls
from the start. As Horstmann and MacDonald observe, such a pattern is not easily
reconciled with the predictions of models in which dissipative advertising is used to
signal quality. This pattern, however, is consistent with the predictions developed here.
Most previous theoretical models assume that advertising is dissipative. For ex-
ample, Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) consider a model of dissipative advertising as a
signal of quality, when ﬁrms are price-takers. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) consider
a model in which a monopolist uses price and dissipative advertising to signal quality
to consumers. They focus on the repeat-purchase dynamics that arise within the in-
troductory phase and report conditions under which the high-quality monopolist may
use dissipative advertising as a signal during the initial portion of this phase. Their
model predicts that the advertising-quality relationship is positive and decreases over
time. Allowing that advertising is demand-enhancing and focusing on the introductory
(signaling) and mature (complete-information) phases, we oﬀer support for precisely the
opposite pattern. Finally, Zhao (2000) and Orzach, Overgaard & Tauman (2002) oﬀer
some ﬁndings that are related to those reported here. In comparison, we develop our
ﬁndings for a general set of demand functions and without the speciﬁc structure that is
required to analyze repeat-purchase behavior.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we set up the basic model in
general form and present some results for the complete-information benchmark. Section
3 turns to the incomplete-information case, presents the analytical approach for the
general case and provides some key propositions. In Sections 4 and 5, we provide
further results under the informative and persuasive views of advertising, respectively.
Section 6 brieﬂy concludes, while some proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Model and Complete-Information Benchmark
We ﬁrst set up a general model of price and advertising signals of the quality of an
experience good in the static case. The reader may wish to consult Bagwell (2005,
Section 6.1) for further details, since we shall use similar notation. Potential customers
are, initially, incompletely informed about the quality of the good on oﬀer. However,
prior to making their purchasing decisions, potential customers observe the price and
6the advertising intensity of the monopoly seller.5 These variables, chosen by the seller,
can therefore serve as signals which inﬂuence the beliefs of potential customers. After
beliefs are formed, purchases are made, payoﬀs are realized, and the static signaling
game ends.
In this section, we present our notation and the basic assumptions of our model. We
also deﬁne and discuss the complete-information benchmark. We postpone the formal
deﬁnition and analysis of the static signaling game until the next section.
2.1. Notation and basic assumptions
Quality. We assume, for simplicity, that quality, q, may either be low or high. Thus, q ∈
{L,H},w h e r e0 ≤ L<H.
Price. The price set by the ﬁrm can take on any non-negative value: p ≥ 0.
Advertising. The level of advertising expenditures (or the number of ads) chosen by the
ﬁrm can take on any non-negative value: A ≥ 0.
Beliefs. Let the consumer assessment of the probability that quality is high (H) after
observing some signal, (p,A), be denoted by b(p,A) ∈ [0,1]. b0 ∈ (0,1) denotes the
prior probability with which Nature selects q = H.
Demand. Consumer demand as a function of price and advertising given some beliefs
is denoted D(p,A;b). Demand is assumed to be suitably regular: positive, continuous
and decreasing in p, increasing and concave in A, and continuous and increasing in b.6
Unit costs. Let unit costs be denoted by c(q), and assume that c(q) ≥ 0, q ∈ {L,H}.
The case where unit costs are increasing in quality, that is, c(H) >c (L), will be referred
to as the normal case.
Payoﬀs.F i r m p a y o ﬀs( o rp r o ﬁts) as a mapping from signals, (p,A), given beliefs and
actual type, (b,q),a r e
π(p,A;b,q)=( p − c(q))D(p,A;b) − A.
We assume that π(p,A;b,q) is nicely behaved for any b and q. That is, there is a unique,
interior maximizer of π(p,A;b,q), which we denote (pm(q,b),A m(q,b)).
5Below, advertising intensity can have several interpretations. In some of the discussion we refer
to the advertising expenditures incurred by the seller, while in other places we refer to the number of
advertising messages. What is important is that potential customers observe these or, at least, can form
an informed opinion about them.
6Throughout, we say that a function f(x) is increasing over some interval [xL,x H] if, for all x1 and
x2 in this interval such that x2 >x 1,w eh a v et h a tf(x2) >f(x1). Analogously, f(x) is decreasing over
this interval if f(x2) <f(x1).
72.2. The complete-information benchmark
In the complete-information benchmark, potential customers know the quality on oﬀer,




which gives rise to the price-advertising pair (pm(H,1),A m(H,1)) ≡ (pM(H),A M(H))





and we obtain (pm(L,0),A m(L,0)) ≡ (pM(L),A M(L)) and π(pm(L,0),A m(L,0);0,L) ≡
ΠM(L) > 0.
3. Incomplete Information and Signaling
We turn next to a formal analysis of the static signaling game. We begin by deﬁning our
equilibrium concept and presenting some basic characteristics of separating equilibria.
We then deﬁne and characterize the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
3.1. Equilibrium concept
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the static signaling game is a set of strategies,
{pq,A q}q=L,H, and beliefs, b(p,A), such that: (i) for each q ∈ {L,H}, (pq,A q) maximizes
π(p,A;b(p,A),q), and (ii) b(p,A) is derived from the equilibrium strategies using Bayes’
rule whenever possible. In a separating equilibrium, (pH,A H) 6=( pL,A L) and thus
b(pH,A H)=1> 0=b(pL,A L). A pooling equilibrium occurs when (pH,A H)=( pL,A L)
and thus b(pH,A H)=b0.
In a separating equilibrium, the low-quality ﬁrm is revealed and can do no better
than to make its complete-information selections, (pL,A L)=( pM(L),A M(L)), and earn
the corresponding proﬁt ΠM(L). Hence, if the high-quality ﬁrm is to separate, it must
choose a price-advertising pair, (pH,A H), which the low-quality ﬁrm has no incentive
to mimic, that is,
π(pH,A H;1,L) ≤ ΠM(L). (3.1)
To make the signaling problem interesting, we assume throughout that this constraint
is binding, that is,
π(pM(H),A M(H);1,L) > ΠM(L). (3.2)
8Thus, the low-quality ﬁrm has an incentive to mimic the complete-information selection
of the high-quality ﬁrm, if this fools potential customers. Hence, to separate, the high-
quality ﬁrm must distort its selection, (pH,A H), away from the complete-information
maximizer, (pM(H),A M(H)).
3.2. Least-cost separating equilibrium
The only equilibrium outcome to survive standard reﬁnement techniques (see, e.g., Cho
and Kreps (1987)) is the so-called least-cost separating outcome,7 which entails that the
high-quality ﬁrm chooses (pH,A H) to solve the following problem:
max
p,A
π(p,A;1,H) s.t. π(p,A;1,L)=ΠM(L). (PH)
To capture the equilibrium relationship between price, advertising and quality, our ﬁrst
aim is to characterize the solution to (PH). To facilitate this, we build on methods
introduced by Bagwell & Ramey (1988) and deﬁne the following “extended” payoﬀ
function
b π(p,A;c)=( p − c)D(p,A;1)− A.
Heuristically, b π(p,A;c) is just a standard payoﬀ function of a ﬁrm with constant unit
costs c, who faces demand D(p,A;1),c h a r g e sap r i c ep and incurs advertising expen-
ditures A.8 Assume that b π(p,A;c) is well-behaved, in the sense that it has a unique,
interior maximizer.9 Let
ϕ(c) ≡ (p(c),A(c)) = argmax
p,A
b π(p,A;c).
This gives rise to the payoﬀs
b Π(c) ≡ b π(p(c),A(c);c).
Note, in particular, that ϕ(c(H)) = (p(c(H)),A(c(H))) = (pM(H),A M(H)).F i n a l l y ,i t
is convenient to impose the following boundary conditions: there exist cb >c (L) and
cs <c (L) such that max{π(ϕ(cb);1,L),π(ϕ(cs);1,L)} < ΠM(L).
Then, we can state the following results (proofs are in the Appendix; see also Over-
gaard (1991, Chapter 2) and the discussion in Bagwell (2005, Section 6.1)).
Proposition 1. The solution to (PH) coincides with ϕ(e c) for some e c.
7In the Appendix, following the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 below, we show that no pooling proﬁles
survive the Cho-Kreps (1987) reﬁnement.
8In other words, b π(p,A;c) represents the proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o raﬁrm that selects p and A, faces unit
cost c and oﬀers a product that is known to be high quality.
9This may put some domain restrictions on c, but this is not important for present purposes.
9Proposition 2. In the normal case where c(H) >c (L), the solution to (PH) is at ϕ(e c)
for some e c>c (H).
Thus, in the normal case, the high-quality ﬁrm makes a cost-increasing distortion,
which implies that the high-quality ﬁrm behaves as if there is complete information, but
it has a higher unit cost e c, e c>c (H).
Assumption (The regular case): p(c) is continuous and increasing in c,a n dA(c) is
continuous and decreasing in c. Further, there exists some (ﬁnite) c such that A(c)=
AM(L).
What we label the regular case is just meant to capture that, with complete in-
formation, a high-quality ﬁrm would increase price and decrease advertising outlays, if
the unit costs of production were to increase. The last part of the assumption ensures
that there is some (ﬁnite) hypothetical level of unit costs, such that under complete
information a high-quality ﬁrm with this level of unit costs would advertise less than a
low-quality ﬁrm. This allows us to state the main result for the general case.
Proposition 3. In the normal and regular case, the high-quality ﬁrm distorts its price
upwards and its advertising level downwards in the least-cost separating equilibrium
outcome. That is,
pH = p(e c) >p M(H) and AH = A(e c) <A M(H).
So, we have shown that the high-quality ﬁrm distorts advertising downwards to signal
quality under the stated assumptions. At the current level of generality, this is about
all we can say. However, we would like to compare the equilibrium choice of the high-
quality ﬁrm, AH = A(e c), with that of the low-quality ﬁrm, AL = AM(L).O fc o u r s e ,i f
costs and demands are such that AM(H) ≤ AM(L), so that the complete-information
level of advertising falls with quality, then the high-quality ﬁrm must advertise less than
the low-quality ﬁrm to signal quality. However, the more interesting case is where the
complete-information level of advertising rises with quality: AM(H) >A M(L).T h ek e y
question is whether the high-quality ﬁrm will have to lower its advertising intensity to
a level below the complete-information level of the low-quality ﬁrm. In the following,
we address this question.
We motivate this question in the Introduction. Here, we make a couple of additional
observations. First, at an empirical level, the resolution of this question may be valuable
by clarifying the predicted relationships among observable variables. In particular, it is
sometimes argued that, according to theory, both price and advertising outlays should
be positively related to quality. Quality may be diﬃcult to observe, however, and price
and advertising selections may be more readily quantiﬁed. Therefore, one might look
for a positive relationship between price and advertising as a weak test of the theory. Of
10course, if it turns out that theory predicts a robust and negative relationship between
advertising and quality, then the absence of a positive relationship between price and
advertising would not constitute evidence against the theory.
Second, on a more positive level, the primary aim of the following sections is to shed
some additional light on the predicted relationship between advertising and quality. In
particular, we study how various speciﬁcations of the inﬂuence of advertising on demand
(for ﬁxed consumer perceptions of quality) aﬀect the predicted equilibrium relationship
between advertising and quality. By establishing general relationships within a uniﬁed
framework, we hope to facilitate a more ambitious empirical research strategy vis a vis
the relationship between price, advertising and the quality of experience goods.
We proceed by considering demand speciﬁcations that are evocative of the informa-
tive and persuasive roles that advertising may respectively play. Henceforth, we restrict
our attention to the normal case; thus, in the following, we maintain the assumption
that c(H) >c (L). For each of the demand speciﬁcations, we then investigate whether
the regular case is obtained.
4. The Informative View of Advertising
We now focus on advertising that plays an informative role. We begin with a simple
base case and then turn to a generalized version of informative advertising. Throughout
the section, our focus is on establishing conditions under which the high-quality ﬁrm
advertises less than would the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium
outcome. At the end of the section, we also oﬀer a novel interpretation of informa-
tive advertising that centers on the notion that informative advertising can work by
activating existing memories in the minds of consumers.
4 . 1 .T h eb a s ec a s e
To obtain some further results on the relationship between quality and advertising, let
us ﬁrst consider the following class of demands
D(p,A;b)=G(A)d(p;b),
where G(·) > 0 satisﬁes G0 > 0 >G 00 and d(·;·) > 0 satisﬁes dp < 0 <d b.10 This is
essentially the second class of demand functions considered in Bagwell (2005, Section
4.1.2), which is taken to reﬂect the informative view of advertising.11 Under this inter-
pretation, G(A) captures the general manner in which advertising increases the size of
10Thus, we now add some structure and assume that demand functions are diﬀerentiable. This
assumption enables us to work with ﬁrst-order conditions.
11For this class of demands, price elasticity is independent of advertising.
11the market. Observe that advertising shifts demand horizontally outwards as illustrated
in Fig. 1. (The ﬁgure is drawn for the case in which d is linear in p.)
p
D(p,A;b)
Fig. 1: Informative advertising - Base case
Following Butters (1977), one interpretation of this demand speciﬁcation is that a
greater number of advertising messages increases the number of customers reached from
a given population. Consumers reached by advertising messages are said to be informed
about the existence of the (new) experience good. Given this interpretation, it makes
good sense to assume that G(A) is increasing and concave in A,w h e r eA is proportional
to the number of messages sent.12
The payoﬀ functions deﬁned in the previous section can then be written as
π(p,A;b,q)=G(A)(p − c(q))d(p;b) − A
and
b π(p,A;c)=G(A)(p − c)d(p;1)− A.
The latter has a maximum at (p(c),A(c)) which deﬁnes
b Π(c) ≡ b π(p(c),A(c);c)=G(A(c))(p(c) − c)d(p(c);1) − A(c).
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions, we have
b πp(p,A;c)=G(A){(p − c)dp(p;1)+d(p;1)} =0 .
For an interior solution, this implies that the optimal price is independent of the adver-
tising level, that is,
(p − c)dp(p;1)+d(p;1)=0
12To be speciﬁc, assume that there is a given total mass of homogenous, potential customers, each
with individual demands as a function of price and beliefs captured by d(p;b). Assume, in addition,
that a fraction G(A) of these potential customers is reached by an advertising campaign of “size” A.
12Thus, p(c) solves
max
p (p − c)d(p;1),
which immediately implies that p(c) is increasing in c,w h i l e(p(c) − c)d(p(c);1) is de-
creasing in c. In addition, we have
b πA(p,A;c)=G0(A)(p − c)d(p;1)− 1=0
into which we can substitute p(c) to obtain
G0(A)(p(c) − c)d(p(c);1) − 1=0 .
Given our assumptions that GA > 0 >G AA,s i n c e(p(c) − c)d(p(c);1) is decreasing in
c, we conclude that the optimal advertising level, A(c),m u s tb ed e c r e a s i n gi nc.T h u s ,
for this class of demands, we are certainly in the regular case, where p(c) is increasing
while A(c) is decreasing in costs.
4.1.1. Comparison of the equilibrium advertising levels
We turn now to the comparison of AH = A(e c) and AL = AM(L) for this class of de-
mands. Under our maintained assumption that c(H) >c (L), we know from Proposition
2t h a te c>c (H). Having established that we are in the regular case, we also know that
A(e c) <A M(H). Thus, if AM(H) ≤ AM(L), then we may immediately conclude that
AH = A(e c) <A M(H) ≤ AM(L)=AL, and so the high-quality ﬁrm then advertises less
than the low-quality ﬁrm, in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
The more interesting case occurs when AM(H) >A M(L). Then AH = A(e c) <
AM(H) and AL = AM(L), but it is not immediately clear whether AH <A L. To
analyze this case, we may suppose, hypothetically, that the putative, separating proﬁle
is made up of (pL,A L)=( pM(L),A M(L)) and (pH,A H)=( p(c∗),A(c∗)) = ϕ(c∗),w h e r e
A(c∗)=AM(L). That is, we suppose that both types choose the same advertising level
in the putative proﬁle. Notice that since we are in the regular case and A(c∗)=AM(L) <
AM(H), it follows that c∗ >c (H) >c (L). Next, we ask whether the low-quality type
w o u l dw a n tt op i c k( m i m i c )ϕ(c∗), provided that b =1following ϕ(c∗).I ft h ea n s w e r
is aﬃrmative, then the high-quality ﬁrm will have to distort further to some ϕ(e c) with
e c>c ∗.13 T h a ti s ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tAH <A L in the least-cost separating
equilibrium outcome.
The relevant payoﬀs can be written as
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L)=G(A(c∗))(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − A(c∗)
13As we conﬁrm in the Appendix, π(ϕ(c);1,L) is decreasing in c for c>c (L).
13and
ΠM(L)=π(pM(L),A M(L);0,L)=G(AM(L))(pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0) − AM(L).
Now, by construction A(c∗)=AM(L),a n dw ec a nw r i t et h ed i ﬀerence between the two
payoﬀs from the perspective of the low-quality ﬁrm as
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L) − ΠM(L)
= G(A(c∗))(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − A(c∗)
−G(AM(L))(pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0) + AM(L)
= G(A(c∗))[(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − (pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0)],
which takes the same sign as
(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − (pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0).
We further note that
b Π(c∗)=G(A(c∗))(p(c∗) − c∗)d(p(c∗);1) − A(c∗).
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions, it follows that
G0(A(c∗))(p(c∗) − c∗)d(p(c∗);1) − 1=0
and
G0(AM(L))(pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0) − 1=0 .
But, then A(c∗)=AM(L) must imply that
(p(c∗) − c∗)d(p(c∗);1) = (pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0).
Since c∗ >c (L) we also have that
(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) > (p(c∗) − c∗)d(p(c∗);1),
and we conclude that
(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − (pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0)




14and we see that the low-quality ﬁrm would deviate from (pM(L),A M(L)) = (pM(L),
A(c∗)) to ϕ(c∗)=( p(c∗),A(c∗)), provided that b(ϕ(c∗)) = 1.T h u s ,t h eh i g h - q u a l i t yﬁrm
must change its selection from ϕ(c∗) to some ϕ(e c) where e c>c ∗, in order to separate
from the low-quality ﬁrm. Hence,
AH = A(e c) <A M(L),
and we conclude that the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm in
the least-cost separating equilibrium for the class of demands considered.
We have thus now established that this conclusion holds irrespective of whether
AM(H) ≤ AM(L) or AM(H) >A M(L). Hence, we can summarize our results as
follows.
Proposition 4. Under the informative view of advertising, the high-quality ﬁrm ad-
vertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
Comment. Somewhat surprisingly, this is the ﬁrst time a result along these lines has been
formally stated in the signaling literature with any degree of generality. Zhao (2000)




to Zhao (2000), the result of this section is very general. It requires only standard
regularity conditions on the monopoly-pricing problem and multiplicative separability
of demand in price and advertising.
4.2. Generalized version of informative advertising
Following the same notation as above, we can consider a more general class of demands
D(p,A;b)=G(A;b)d(p;b),
where G(·) > 0 satisﬁes GA > 0,G b ≥ 0, and GAA < 0 while d(·) > 0 satisﬁes
dp < 0 <d b. Note that this class retains the multiplicative separability of demand








Under the given assumptions, a suﬃcient condition for this inequality is GAb ≤ 0. This
includes the base case above, where Gb ≡ 0 ≡ GAb.
The proﬁt function of the ﬁr mc a nn o wb ew r i t t e na s
π(p,A;b,q)=( p − c(q))G(A;b)d(p;b) − A.
15As above, we let (pM(L),A M(L)) maximize π(p,A;0,L) and (pM(H),A M(H)) maxi-
mize π(p,A;1 ,H). For future reference, we observe that the ﬁrst-order condition for
AM(L) is given as
πA(pM(L),A;0,L)=( pM(L) − c(L))GA(A;0)d(pM(L);0) − 1=0 .
Similarly, the extended proﬁt function is
b π(p,A;c)=( p − c)G(A;1)d(p;1)− A.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the extended proﬁt function deﬁne the maximizer ϕ(c) ≡
(p(c),A(c)) and are given by
b πp(p,A;c)=G(A;1){(p − c)dp(p;1)+d(p;1)} =0
and
b πA(p,A;c)=GA(A;1)(p − c)d(p;1)− 1=0 .
Notice that p(c) thus maximizes (p − c)d(p;1)and satisﬁes
(p − c)dp(p;1)+d(p;1)=0.
As before, this implies that p(c) is increasing in c,w h i l e(p − c)d(p;1)is decreasing in
c. Substituting p(c) into the ﬁrst-order condition for A(c),w et h u sh a v et h a t
b πA(p(c),A;c)=GA(A;1)(p(c) − c)d(p(c);1) − 1=0 .
Given our assumptions that GA > 0 >G AA,s i n c e(p(c)−c)d(p(c);1) is decreasing in c,
we have that A(c) is decreasing in c .
We conclude that this model falls within the regular case, in that p(c) is increasing
in c while A(c) is decreasing in c. The argument is precisely the same as that above.
4.2.1. Comparison of the equilibrium advertising levels
Given our maintained assumption that c(H) >c (L) and our ﬁnding that the model falls
within the regular case, we know that AH = A(e c) where e c>c (H) and A(e c) <A M(H).
T h u s ,a sa b o v e ,i fAM(H) ≤ AM(L)=AL, then we may immediately conclude that
the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm: AH <A L. The inter-
esting case occurs when AM(H) >A M(L). To analyze this case, we again hypothesize
a putative separating proﬁle in which (pL,A L)=( pM(L),A M(L)) and (pH,A H)=
(p(c∗),A(c∗)) = ϕ(c∗),w h e r ec∗ >c (H) and A(c∗)=AM(L). We again ask whether the
low-quality monopolist would be willing to mimic ϕ(c∗).
16We evaluate the diﬀerence in proﬁts from the perspective of the low-quality ﬁrm
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L) − π(pM(L),A M(L);0,L)
= G(A(c∗);1)(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − A(c∗)
−G(AM(L);0)(pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0) + AM(L)
= G(A(c∗);1)(p(c∗) − c(L))d(p(c∗);1) − G(AM(L);0)(pM(L) − c(L))d(pM(L);0)








where the second equality uses A(c∗)=AM(L),t h eﬁrst inequality follows since c∗ >
c(H) >c (L), the following equality uses the ﬁrst-order conditions for A(c∗) and AM(L)
along with A(c∗)=AM(L),w h i l et h eﬁnal inequality uses our assumption on the cross-
partial of lnG(A;b).
Thus, the low-quality ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from (pM(L),A M(L)) to ϕ(c∗),
provided that b(ϕ(c∗)) = 1. The high-quality ﬁrm must change its selection from ϕ(c∗)
to some ϕ(e c) where e c>c ∗, and we conclude (again) that the high-quality ﬁrm advertises
less than the low-quality ﬁrm: AH = A(e c) <A M(L)=AL.14
Proposition 5. Under the generalized informative view of advertising, the high-quality
ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium
outcome.
4.3. A memory-activation interpretation of informative advertising
To arrive at a generalized informative view of advertising, what we have added beyond
the base case is that the ability of advertising to bring in more consumers may be lower
when consumers have more optimistic beliefs, holding ﬁxed the price (i.e., GAb ≤ 0).
In other words, advertising shifts out demand at a rate that depends on consumer
beliefs, with the shift perhaps being greatest when consumers are least optimistic. This
is consistent with the idea that large doses of advertising and optimistic beliefs both
work to increase patronage and are substitutes. Intuitively, if beliefs are pessimistic,
advertising can be very eﬀective; however, if beliefs are optimistic, then there may be
less that is left for advertising to do.
14While we emphasize the relationship between advertising and quality, we also have results that
pertain to the price-quality relationship. In particular, we can establish the following: Under the gen-
eralized informative view of advertising, if dpb ≥ 0 and πpp(p,A;0,L) < 0, the high-quality ﬁrm sets
a higher price than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome. Details are
available from the authors.
17An example will illustrate this idea. Let us suppose that all potential customers are
aware of the general advertising expenditures and pricing selected by the ﬁrm. They are
all informed in this sense, and they have all formed general beliefs, b, about the product.
The issue is rather whether, at a given purchase moment in time, the product is in the
consumer’s “consideration set”. Suppose that there are two ways that a product can
enter into a consumer’s consideration set. First, it may be that the consumer actually
receives a particular ad and is, thus, prompted to recall the product and consider a
potential purchase. This is a memory-activation role for advertising, although one that
presumes no direct prior experience with the product. Following Butters (1977), let us
assume that the probability that no speciﬁc ad reaches a given consumer is e−A/N,w h e n
A messages are sent randomly to N consumers. Thus, speciﬁca d sa r er e c e i v e da tt h e
purchase moment by N(1 − e−A/N) consumers. Second, absent any direct exposure to
an advertising message, it may be that a consumer is more likely to consider a product
for purchase at a given moment in time, when the consumer has assigned a high belief
to the quality of the product. In particular, if, after learning the ﬁrm’s general price
and advertising behavior, the consumer assigns a belief b as to the likelihood that the
product is of high quality, then the consumer is more likely to consider the product for
p o t e n t i a lp u r c h a s ea tag i v e nm o m e n ti nt i m ew h e nb is larger. The assumption here
is that perceived higher-quality products a r em o r el i k e l yt ob ea tt h ef o r e f r o n to ft h e
consumer’s consciousness. Let f(b) denote the probability that the consumer does not
consider the product for possible purchase; thus, we assume that f(b) is decreasing.
The number of consumers for whom the product springs to mind (independently of
advertising) is thus N(1 − f(b)).
To summarize, for this example we have that
G(A;b)=N(1 − e−A/N)+N(1 − f(b))e−A/N
= N(1 − f(b)e−A/N).
Alternatively, G(A;b) can be written as
G(A;b)=N(1 − f(b))(1 − e−A/N)+Nf(b)(1 − e−A/N)+N(1 − f(b))e−A/N
f r o mw h i c hw en o t i c et h a tt h eﬁrst term indicates a potential redundancy to advertising:
some consumers are reached, for whom the product already springs to mind. In the end,
everyone considers the product, except those that neither received a speciﬁca dn o rh a d
the product come to mind. We observe that GA = f(b)e−A/N > 0 > −f(b)e−A/N/N =







N(1 − f(b)e−A/N)2 < 0.
Thus, this example satisﬁes the assumptions made above.
18It is interesting to compare this example with Nelson’s (1974) perspective on the
memory-activation role of advertising.15 Nelson argues that advertising is more eﬀec-
tive for high-quality goods, since the activation of consumer memory for such goods is
more productive. Intuitively, advertising activates the recollection of a past purchase
experience, and this recollection is more likely to result in a purchase for a high-quality
product. Under this perspective, advertising and optimistic beliefs are complements.
By contrast, in the example above, we do not allow for past purchase experiences (i.e.,
quality itself does not enter into expected consumer utility). Instead, the reception of an
advertising message induces the consumer to recollect a prior belief about the product.
Further, we assume that such a recollection may happen independently of advertising.
In particular, when the belief formed is more optimistic, the recollection is more likely to
occur anyhow. For this reason, an optimistic consumer is less likely to need advertising
to recall his belief about the product.
This speciﬁce x a m p l eo ﬀers a novel perspective of “informative advertising” in the
context of memory activation. At a modeling level, the dilemma in developing such a
perspective is to reconcile imperfect memories with rational (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs and
signaling. Our approach is to separate the processes somewhat: all consumers see the
aggregate advertising expenditures and the price and form Bayesian beliefs, but at the
time of purchase only a fraction - which depends on aggregate advertising expenditures
and beliefs - remember to consider the product.
5. The Persuasive View of Advertising
In the previous section we focused on informative advertising by positing a demand
side in which the direct eﬀect of increased advertising was to tap deeper into a given
pool of potential customers with ﬁxed willingness-to-pay for given assessments of the
quality of the product on oﬀer. In contrast, we now want to allow for the possiblity
that advertising directly shifts up the consumer valuations of the ﬁrm’s product. We
capture this by positing demand functions for which an increase in advertising results
in an upward vertical shift of the demand function at all quantities; hence, we now
assume that an increase in advertising generates an increase in willingness-to-pay at
all quantities. These direct eﬀects of advertising on demand can be understood as
representing the persuasive view of advertising.16
We begin with some preliminaries and then turn to a base case, in which the mag-
nitude of the upward shift in demand that is induced by advertising is independent
of the beliefs held by consumers. We next analyze a generalized version of persuasive
15For further discussion of Nelson’s (1974) work in this regard, see Bagwell (2005, Sections 2.3 and
6.2).
16It is also possible to understand this model as representing the complementary view of advertising.
For further discussion of the persuasive and complementary views of advertising, see Bagwell (2005).
19advertising that allows for interactions between advertising and beliefs. Thoughout the
section, our focus is on establishing conditions under which the high-quality monopo-
list advertises less than would the low-quality monopolist, in the least-cost separating
equilibrium outcome.
5.1. Preliminaries
We recall from Section 3 that, if a high-quality ﬁrm advertises less under complete
information than does a low-quality monopolist, then the process of signaling will only
reinforce this diﬀerence. On the other hand, if the high-quality ﬁrm advertises more
under complete information than does a low-quality monopolist, then it is not a priori
clear whether a high-quality ﬁrm continues to advertise more when signaling issues
are introduced. Thus, a ﬁrst step is to establish conditions under which the complete-
information advertising levels of the high-quality and the low-quality ﬁrm can be ranked.
Subsequently, we again consider the case in which complete-information advertising is
greater for a high-quality ﬁrm and ask when this ranking is reversed by incomplete
information and signaling.
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we pause to develop some general in-
tuition as to the conditions under which a high-quality ﬁrm is relatively attracted to a
lower level of advertising. Recall that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function is
π(p,A;b,q)=( p − c(q))D(p,A;b) − A,
where c(H) >c (L). Consequently, the ﬁrst-order condition for advertising is
πA =( p − c(q))DA(p,A;b) − 1=0 .
Consider the complete-information setting. If, hypothetically, the mark-up were lower
for a high-quality good, then DA would have to be higher at the high-quality price-
advertising selections with b =1than at the low-quality price-advertising selections
with b =0 . Suppose, for example, that DAp = DAb =0and DAA < 0. Note, in particu-
lar, that DAb =0implies that advertising and beliefs do not interact (at the margin) in
aﬀecting the willingness-to-pay of consumers. Hence, advertising and beliefs are inde-
pendent “instruments” in this case. Given these assumptions, DA c a nb em a d eh i g h e r
only by making A lower. From this line of reasoning we may discern an outline of con-
ditions under which the complete-information advertising levels of the two types of the
ﬁrm can be ranked. This requires some additional structure on the demand function
(notably, the relationship between advertising intensity and quantity demanded), along
with some conditions under which the complete-information mark-ups of the two types
are rankable. Roughly, the latter is related to whether cost eﬀects are more or less im-
portant for mark-ups than are belief eﬀects. Finally, we note that assuming advertising
20and beliefs to be substitutes in aﬀecting willingness-to-pay, that is, DAb < 0, should
only help the argument: If higher beliefs (speciﬁcally, b =1 )work to lower DA, then
an even greater reduction in A is required from the high-quality monopolist in order to
elevate DA to the necessary level.
5.2. Persuasive advertising
5.2.1. The base case




> 0 >f 00,a n dg(0) >c (H) >c (L) ≥ 0, g0(b) > 0.T h i s d e m a n d
speciﬁcation, of course, subsumes DAp = DAb =0 . The base-case demand function is
illustrated in Fig. 2 for diﬀerent values of A and b, where higher A and/or b result in
demands further from the origin.
p
D(p,A;b)
Fig. 2: Persuasive advertising - Base case
I nt h eb a s ec a s e ,w ef u r t h e ra s s u m et h a t
d(ff0)
dA
= ff00 +( f0)2 ≤ 0. (5.1)
This simple demand function allows that both advertising and beliefs are (indepen-
dently) capable of raising the willingness-to-pay of consumers, and it can be motivated
with reference to some examples. Below, we will determine if additional assumptions
are needed to ensure that these demand functions are suﬃcient to establish that we are
in the regular case.
Example 1: Suppose that a mass of heterogenous consumers have unit demands, where
ac o n s u m e ro ft y p eθ elects to buy if θ+[bH+(1−b)L]+f(A)−p ≥ 0. Assuming that θ is
21distributed uniformly over the interval [0,1],w eﬁnd that the demand function is given as
D(p,A;b)=1 + [ bH+(1−b)L]+f(A)−p. Here, we may think of g(b)=1 + [ bH+(1−b)L],
where the bracketed term is expected quality. If 1+L>c (H) and H>L≥ 0,
then g satisﬁes the assumptions listed above. We may impose directly the remaining
assumptions on f. As this example illustrates, a consumer’s intrinsic valuation for a
product (i.e., θ) is enhanced when the consumer becomes more optimistic about the
quality of the product and/or when the consumer is exposed to advertising.
Example 2: Suppose directly that g satisﬁes the assumptions listed above and let f(A)=
Aα,w h e r eα ∈ (0,1/2]. Then it is straightforward to verify that the stated assumptions
on f are all satisﬁed for A>0. Likewise, the stated assumptions all hold when f(A)=
ln(A+e), for A ≥ 0. Our assumptions are thus satisﬁed by a large class of “reasonable”
functions.
Formally, in the base case the proﬁt function is
π(p,A;b,q)=( p − c(q))[f(A)+g(b) − p] − A.
Thus, the ﬁrst-order conditions are17
πp = f(A)+g(b)+c(q) − 2p =0 (5.2)
πA =[ p − c(q)]f0(A) − 1=0 . (5.3)









We can combine (5.3) and (5.5) to obtain the following necessary condition on the
proﬁt-maximizing advertising level,
[f(A)+g(b) − c(q)]f0(A)=2 . (5.6)
In particular, (5.6) must hold in the complete-information settings, in which q = H and
b =1 , and q = L and b =0 , respectively. Thus, we have
[f(AM(H)) + g(1) − c(H)]f0(AM(H)) = 2, (5.7)
17Given our assumptions, the second-order conditions are satisﬁed when the ﬁrst-order conditions
hold, since
πpp = −2 < 0
πAA =[ p − c(q)]f
00(A) < 0





00(g − c(q)] > 0
where J denotes the Jacobian matrix associated with the system of ﬁrst-order conditions.
22[f(AM(L)) + g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(L)) = 2. (5.8)
Subtracting (5.8) from (5.7), we thus obtain our key equation,
0=f(AM(H))f0(AM(H)) − f(AM(L))f0(AM(L)) (5.9)
+[g(1) − c(H)]f0(AM(H)) − [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(L)).
We now distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 (Cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects): g(1) − c(H) <g (0) − c(L)
Suppose that AM(H) ≥ AM(L). Under (5.1), this implies that
f(AM(H))f0(AM(H)) − f(AM(L))f0(AM(L)) ≤ 0. (5.10)
We may now derive that
0 ≤ [g(1) − c(H)]f0(AM(H)) − [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(L))
< [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(H)) − [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(L))
=[ g(0) − c(L)][f0(AM(H)) − f0(AM(L))]
≤ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality uses (5.9) and (5.10), the second inequality uses the assumption
that cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects along with f0 > 0, and the ﬁnal inequality uses
our supposition that AM(H) ≥ AM(L) along with our assumptions that f00 < 0 <f 0
and g(0) − c(L) > 0. Having reached a contradiction, we conclude that the supposition
is incompatible with our other assumptions. Thus, when cost eﬀects dominate, it must
be true that under complete information, the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than does
the low-quality ﬁrm, that is, AM(H) <A M(L).
Case 2 (Belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects): g(0) − c(L) <g (1) − c(H)
Suppose AM(L) ≥ AM(H). Under (5.1), this implies that
f(AM(H))f0(AM(H)) − f(AM(L))f0(AM(L)) ≥ 0. (5.11)
We may now derive that
0 ≥ [g(1) − c(H)]f0(AM(H)) − [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(L))
> [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(H)) − [g(0) − c(L)]f0(AM(L))
=[ g(0) − c(L)][f0(AM(H)) − f0(AM(L))]
≥ 0,
where the ﬁrst inequality uses (5.9) and (5.11), the second inequality uses the assumption
that belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects along with f0 > 0, and the ﬁnal inequality uses
23our supposition that AM(L) ≥ AM(H) along with our assumptions that f00 < 0 <f 0 and
g(0)−c(L) > 0. Having, again, reached a contradiction, we conclude that the supposition
is incompatible with our other assumptions. Thus, when belief eﬀects dominate, it must
be true that under complete information, the high-quality ﬁrm advertises more than
does the low-quality ﬁrm, AM(H) >A M(L).
We summarize our analysis of the complete-information case in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For the base-case demand function,
(i) if cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects, g(1) − c(H) <g (0) − c(L), then under
complete information the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm,
AM(H) <A M(L),a n d
(ii) if belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects, g(0) − c(L) <g (1) − c(H), then under
complete information the high-quality ﬁrm advertises more than the low-quality ﬁrm,
AM(H) >A M(L).
Comparison of the equilibrium advertising levels Let us now turn to the incom-
plete-information case. As noted previously, if the base-case demand function puts us in
the regular case, so that a high-quality ﬁrm would advertise less and price higher if its
unit costs were to increase, and if cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects, so that AM(H) <
AM(L), then we may immediately conclude that the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less
in the least-cost separating equilibrium than does the low-quality ﬁrm, since AH <
AM(H) <A M(L)=AL. Thus, we just need to check whether we are indeed in the
regular case. Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions, (5.2) and (5.3), when b =






f00(A(c))f(A(c)) + 2(f0(A(c))2 +( g(1) − c)f00(A(c))
2 | J(c) |
},
where J(c) is the Jacobian matrix associated with the ﬁrst-order conditions and | J(c) |>
0 under our maintained assumption that b π(p,A;c) has a unique, interior maximizer.
We thus see that A(c) is indeed decreasing. We observe that p(c) is increasing if our
assumptions are strengthened somewhat so that g(1) >cand f00f +2 ( f0)2 ≤ 0. In any
case, we may now conclude as follows.
Proposition 6. For the base-case demand function, if cost eﬀects dominate belief ef-
fects, g(1) − c(H) <g (0) − c(L), then the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the
low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
24Finally, let us focus on the more interesting case in which belief eﬀects dominate cost
eﬀects, g(0)−c(L) <g (1)−c(H). Recall that, in this case, under complete information
the high-quality ﬁrm advertises more than the low-quality ﬁrm, AM(H) >A M(L). It
is thus as yet unclear whether the high-quality monopolist advertises less in the reﬁned
separating equilibrium that emerges under incomplete information.
To make headway on this issue, we proceed as in Section 4 and compare the low-
quality ﬁrm’s selection, (pM(L),A M(L)), with the selection that a high-quality ﬁrm
w o u l dm a k ew e r ei t sc o s t sc∗, where c∗ is deﬁned by AM(L)=A(c∗). We establish
above that A(c) is decreasing. Our focus on the case wherein belief eﬀects dominate
cost eﬀects ensures that AM(L) <A M(H) and, thus, that c∗ >c (H) >c (L). If we ﬁnd
that the low-quality ﬁrm would mimic (p(c∗),A(c∗)), then we conclude that the high-
quality ﬁrm achieves least-cost separation by making the selection that would maximize
its complete-information proﬁt were its costs e c>c ∗. In this event, AH = A(e c) <A (c∗)=
AM(L)=AL, and, thus, we conclude that the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the
low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
This discussion motivates the following derivations. First, consider the proﬁtd i ﬀer-
ence from the perspective of the low-quality ﬁrm:
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L) − π(pM(L),A M(L);0,L)
=[ p(c∗) − c(L)]D(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) − [pM(L) − c(L)]D(pM(L),A(c∗);0)
> [p(c∗) − c∗]D(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) − [pM(L) − c(L)]D(pM(L),A(c∗);0),
where the equality uses A(c∗)=AM(L), while the inequality uses c∗ >c (L).N o w ,w e
can use the ﬁrst-order conditions for advertising (i.e., [p(c∗)−c∗]DA(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) = 1
and [pM(L) − c(L)]DA(pM(L),A(c∗);0) = 1)a n dDA(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) = DA(pM(L),
A(c∗);0) = f0(A(c∗)) to obtain











Further, inserting the solutions for prices (i.e., p(c∗)=[ f(A(c∗)) + g(1) + c∗]/2 and
pM(L)=[ f(A(c∗))+g(0)+c(L)]/2) and demands (i.e., D(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) = f(A(c∗))+




[g(1) − g(0)] − [p(c∗) − pM(L)]
f0(A(c∗))
=
[g(1) − c∗] − [g(0) − c(L)]
2f0(A(c∗))
.
Hence, we may now conclude that
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L) − π(pM(L),A M(L);0,L) >
[g(1) − c∗] − [g(0) − c(L)]
2f0(A(c∗))
if belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects. However, recall from (5.8) that
[f(A(c∗)) + g(0) − c(L)]f0(A(c∗)) = 2.
Analogously, the ﬁrst-order conditions for p(c∗) and A(c∗) can be combined to yield
[f(A(c∗)) + g(1) − c∗]f0(A(c∗)) = 2.
Combining and using f0(A(c∗)) > 0,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
g(1) − c∗ = g(0) − c(L),
and we ﬁnally conclude that
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L) − π(pM(L),A M(L);0,L) > 0
if A(c∗)=AM(L). Thus, we can state the following result.
Proposition 7. Consider the base-case demand function and suppose that belief eﬀects
dominate cost eﬀects, g(0) − c(L) <g (1) − c(H). Deﬁne c∗ >c (H) by A(c∗)=AM(L).
Then c∗ = c(L)+( g(1) − g(0)), and it follows that the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less
than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
Combining Propositions 6 and 7, we ﬁnd that the high-quality ﬁrm always advertises
less than the low-quality ﬁrm, when persuasive advertising is of the form that gives rise to
our base-case demand function.18 This parallels our ﬁndings for informative advertising
in Section 4. Summarizing:
Proposition 8. Under the persuasive view of advertising, the high-quality ﬁrm adver-
tises less than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
18If belief eﬀects and cost eﬀects exactly oﬀset, g(0) − c(L)=g(1) − c(H), then AM(H)=AM(L),
and hence AH = A(e c) <A M(H)=AM(L)=AL. Thus, our ﬁnding holds in this remaining case as well.
265.2.2. Generalized version of persuasive advertising
We now consider the following generalized representation of persuasive advertising
D(p,A;b)=h(A;b) − p,
where hA > 0 >h AA,h>c (H) >c (L) ≥ 0, and hb > 0.W ea s s u m ef u r t h e rt h a t
d(h − c(q))hA
dA
=( h − c(q))hAA +( hA)2 < 0. (5.12)
Again, the demand function allows that advertising and beliefs both raise the willingness-
to-pay of consumers, while we have not yet speciﬁed the possible interactions between
advertising and beliefs in the function h.
The proﬁt function is now
π(P,A;b,q)=( p − c(q))[h(A;b) − p] − A,
and the ﬁrst-order conditions are19
πp = h(A;b)+c(q) − 2p =0 (5.13)
πA =[ p − c(q)]hA(A;b) − 1=0 . (5.14)









We may combine (5.14) and (5.16) to obtain the following necessary condition on
the proﬁt-maximizing advertising level,
[h(A;b) − c(q)]hA(A;b)=2 . (5.17)
In particular, (5.17) must hold in the complete-information settings, in which q = H
and b =1 , and q = L and b =0 , respectively. Thus, we have that
[h(AM(H);1) − c(H)]hA(AM(H);1) = 2 (5.18)
19Under our assumptions, the second-order conditions are satisﬁed when the ﬁrst-order conditions
hold, since
πpp = −2 < 0
πAA =[ p − c(q)]hAA(A;b) < 0
| J |≡ πppπAA − (πAp)
2 = −[(h − c(q))hAA +( hA)
2] > 0.
27[h(AM(L);0) − c(L)]hA(AM(L);0) = 2. (5.19)
Subtracting (5.19) from (5.18), we thus obtain a new version of the key equation,
0=[ h(AM(H);1) − c(H)]hA(AM(H);1) − [h(AM(L);0) − c(L)]hA(AM(L);0). (5.20)
For consistency with the approach for the base case, we initially distinguish between
two cases where cost eﬀects and belief eﬀects dominate, respectively. By adding the
interactions DAb 6=0 , we note in advance that the cases are no longer exhaustive.
Case 1 (Cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects, and advertising and beliefs are substitutes):
At any given A, h(A;1)− c(H) <h (A;0)− c(L),a n dhAb ≤ 0.
In this case, we have that
0 > [h(A;1)− c(H)]hA(A;0)− [h(A;0)− c(L)]hA(A;0)
≥ [h(A;1)− c(H)]hA(A;1)− [h(A;0)− c(L)]hA(A;0),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from h(A;1)−c(H) <h (A;0)−c(L),w h i l et h es e c o n d
inequality is a consequence of hAb ≤ 0. In particular, in Case 1 when A = AM(L), we
have
0 > [h(AM(L);1) − c(H)]hA(AM(L);1) − [h(AM(L);0) − c(L)]hA(AM(L);0). (5.21)
Let us now suppose that AM(H) ≥ AM(L). Using (5.12) and (5.21), we conclude that
0 > [h(AM(H);1) − c(H)]hA(AM(H);1) − [h(AM(L);0) − c(L)]hA(AM(L);0). (5.22)
But (5.22) contradicts our key equation (5.20), and so we conclude that the supposition
that AM(H) ≥ AM(L) is incompatible with our assumptions. It thus follows that
AM(H) <A M(L).
Case 2 (Belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects, and advertising and beliefs are comple-
ments): At any given A, h(A;1)− c(H) >h (A;0)− c(L),a n dhAb ≥ 0.
In this case, we have that
0 < [h(A;1)− c(H)]hA(A;1)− [h(A;0)− c(L)]hA(A;1)
≤ [h(A;1)− c(H)]hA(A;1)− [h(A;0)− c(L)]hA(A;0),
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from h(A;1)−c(H) >h (A;0)−c(L),w h i l et h es e c o n d
inequality is a consequence of hAb ≥ 0. In particular, in Case 2 when A = AM(H), we
have
0 < [h(AM(H);1)−c(H)]hA(AM(H);1)−[h(AM(H);0)−c(L)]hA(AM(H);0). (5.23)
28Let us now suppose that AM(L) ≥ AM(H). Using (5.12) and (5.23), we conclude that
0 < [h(AM(H);1) − c(H)]hA(AM(H);1) − [h(AM(L);0) − c(L)]hA(AM(L);0). (5.24)
But (5.23) contradicts our key equation (5.20), and so we conclude that our supposition
that AM(L) ≥ AM(H) is incompatible with our assumptions. It thus follows that
AM(L) <A M(H) .
We summarize results so far in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For the demand function described by our generalized version of persuasive
advertising,
(i) if cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects, h(A;1)− c(H) <h (A;0)− c(L),a n da d -
vertising and beliefs are substitutes, hAb ≤ 0, then under complete information the
high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm, that is, AM(H) <A M(L),
and
(ii) if belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects, h(A;1)− c(H) >h (A;0)− c(L), and
advertising and beliefs are complements, hAb ≥ 0, then under complete information the
high-quality ﬁrm advertises more than the low-quality ﬁrm, that is, AM(H) >A M(L).
We reiterate that this characterization of cases under the generalized version is not
exhaustive, since each case involves assumptions that must hold for all advertising levels,
A. In the special case that h(A;b)=f(A)+g(b), however, we have that [h(A;1)−c(H)]−
[h(A;0)− c(L)] = [g(1) − c(H)] − [g(0) − c(L)] is independent of A and that hAb =0 .
Then, the two cases are exhaustive, and this special case, indeed, corresponds to our
base case. To see the relation between the assumptions, notice that our assumption,
d(h − c(q))hA
dA
=( h − c(q))hAA +( hA)2 < 0,
in this case can be rewritten as
(f + g − c(q))f00 +( f0)2 = ff00 +( f0)2 +( g − c(q))f00 ≤ 0.
In our base case model, we achieved this inequality with the separate assumptions that
ff00 +( f0)2 ≤ 0,g>c (q) and f00 < 0.
Heuristically and somewhat loosely (by continuity), the import of Lemma 2 is the
following. If cost eﬀects are strong compared to belief eﬀects and advertising and beliefs
are either substitutes or weak complements, then under complete information the high-
quality ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm. In contrast, if beliefs eﬀects are
strong compared to costs eﬀects and advertising and beliefs are either complements
or weak substitutes, then under complete information the high-quality ﬁrm advertises
more than the low-quality ﬁrm. A full characterization for the complete-information
29case would require further speciﬁcation of h. However, below we show that whether cost
eﬀects or beliefs eﬀects dominate, and, thus, whether the high-quality ﬁrm advertises
more or less than the low-quality ﬁrm under complete information, if advertising and
beliefs are substitutes, DAb ≤ 0, then the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less than the
low-quality ﬁrm in the reﬁned equilibrium of the game with incomplete information.
Comparison of the equilibrium advertising levels As discussed previously, if
the generalized-version demand function puts us in the regular case, so that a high-
quality ﬁrm would advertise less and price higher if its unit costs were to increase,
and if cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects and advertising and beliefs are substitutes, so
that AM(H) <A M(L), then we conclude that the high-quality ﬁrm advertises less in
the least-cost separating equilibrium than the low-quality ﬁrm, since AH <A M(H) <
AM(L)=AL. We therefore investigate whether we are, indeed, in the regular case.
Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions, (5.13) and (5.14), when b =1and c(q)





(h(A(c);1) − c)hAA(A(c);1) + 2(hA(A(c);1))2
2 | J(c) |
},
where | J(c) |> 0 is again the determinant of the associated Jacobian matrix. We thus
see that A(c) is indeed decreasing. We also observe that p(c) is increasing if our assump-
tions are strengthened somewhat so that (h(A(c);1)−c)hAA(A(c);1)+2(hA(A(c);1))2 <
0. In any case, we may now conclude as follows.
Proposition 9. For the demand function described by the generalized version of per-
suasive advertising, if cost eﬀects dominate belief eﬀects, h(A;1)−c(H) <h (A;0)−c(L),
advertising and beliefs are substitutes, hAb ≤ 0, then the high-quality ﬁrm advertises
less than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
The proposition describes a set of suﬃcient conditions for AM(H) <A M(L) and thereby
for the conclusion that AH <A L. More generally, in light of our ﬁnding that A0(c) < 0,
we may conclude that AH <A L whenever AM(H) ≤ AM(L).
We next turn to the case where AM(H) >A M(L). As noted above, this case can be
achieved while maintaining our assumption that advertising and beliefs are substitutes,
if belief eﬀects are strong compared to cost eﬀects. Let us therefore suppose that
AM(H) >A M(L),h Ab ≤ 0 and h(A;1)− c(H) >h (A;0)− c(L). A si nt h eb a s ec a s e ,
we hypothetically compare the low-quality ﬁrm’s selection, (pM(L),A M(L)),w i t ht h e
selection that a high-quality ﬁrm would make were its costs c∗, where c∗ is deﬁned by
30AM(L)=A(c∗). Given that A0(c) < 0 and AM(H) >A M(L)=A(c∗), it follows that
c∗ >c (H) >c (L).
Taking the perspective of the low-quality ﬁrm, we may use c∗ >c (L) to establish
π(p(c∗),A(c∗);1,L) − π(pM(L),A M(L);0,L)
=[ p(c∗) − c(L)]D(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) − [pM(L) − c(L)]D(pM(L),A(c∗);0)
> [p(c∗) − c∗]D(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) − [pM(L) − c(L)]D(pM(L),A(c∗);0).
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions for advertising (i.e., [p(c∗) − c∗]DA(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) = 1
and [pM(L) − c(L)]DA(pM(L),A(c∗);0) = 1), DA(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) = hA(A(c∗);1) and
DA(pM(L),A (c∗);0) = hA(A(c∗);0) we get














Further, inserting the solutions for prices (i.e., p(c∗)=[ h(A(c∗);1)+c∗]/2 and pM(L)=
[h(A(c∗);0) + c(L)]/2) and demands (i.e., D(p(c∗),A(c∗);1) = h(A(c∗);1) − p(c∗) and



















Hence, we may now conclude that






if AM(H) >A M(L) so that c∗ >c (H) >c (L).
However, recall from (5.19) that
[h(A(c∗);0) − c(L)]hA(A(c∗);0) = 2.
Likewise, the ﬁrst-order conditions for p(c∗) and A(c∗) may be combined to yield
[h(A(c∗);1) − c∗]hA(A(c∗);1) = 2.
31Combining and using hA > 0,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o




Hence, if A(c∗)=AM(L),t h e n




















where the equality uses [h(A(c∗);0) − c(L)]hA(A(c∗);0) = 2, and the last inequality
follows from hAb ≤ 0.
We may now state the following result.
Proposition 10. For the demand function described by the generalized version of per-
suasive advertising, if belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects, h(A;1)−c(H) >h (A;0)−c(L),
and if advertising and beliefs are substitutes, hAb ≤ 0, then the high-quality ﬁrm adver-
tises less than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium outcome.
As explained previously, the argument is immediate if AM(H) ≤ AM(L). If instead
AM(H) >A M(L) obtains, then the argument presented immediately above establishes
that AH = A(e c) <A M(H) ≤ AM(L)=AL.
Combining the ﬁndings reported above, we have our ﬁnal result on persuasive ad-
vertising.20
Proposition 11. Under the generalized persuasive view of advertising, the high-quality
ﬁrm advertises less than the low-quality ﬁrm in the least-cost separating equilibrium
outcome if advertising and beliefs are substitutes.
This last result formalizes our opening statement that substitutability of advertising
and beliefs in aﬀecting willingness-to-pay strengthens whatever tendency there might
be of the high-quality ﬁrm to lower advertising below the level of the low-quality ﬁrm
in the reﬁned equilibrium.
20If AM(H) ≤ AM(L), the argument is immediate, and so we addressed in detail the case in which
AM(H) >A M(L). By Lemma 2, it then must be that either belief eﬀects dominate cost eﬀects or neither
eﬀect dominates the other for all advertising levels. In any event, the proof that precedes Proposition
10 utilizes only the assumptions that AM(H) >A M(L) and hAb ≤ 0. Proposition 11 is thus established.
326. Concluding Remarks
An extensive literature considers the role of advertising as a signal of quality. We
contribute to this literature by showing that, for a wide range of demand functions,
in the least-cost separating equilibrium, a high-quality monopolist advertises less than
would a low-quality monopolist. We develop this result in a general static signaling
model that allows for price and advertising to serve as joint signals of quality. As
discussed in the Introduction, the price and advertising selections that emerge in the
static signaling model can be understood to correspond to the choices that would be
made in the introductory phase of a two-phase signaling framework. Our work thus
suggests that the correlation between advertising and quality will be negative in the
introductory phase of a product’s life cycle. The correlation should “strengthen” as the
product enters its mature phase, as the correlation will then be less negative or even
positive. Consistent with earlier work, we also predict that the price-quality correlation
weakens over time. These predictions are broadly consistent with some recent empirical
ﬁndings and may serve a useful role by guiding the speciﬁcation of future empirical
analyses.
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35Appendix
In this Appendix, we ﬁrst prove Proposition 1 and 2, and then we rule out pooling
outcomes.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
We want to show that some pair (p,A) on ϕ(c) uniquely maximizes π(p,A;1,H)
given the binding constraint π(p,A;1,L)=ΠM(L).
Our ﬁrst step is to show that π(ϕ(c);1,H) is decreasing in c for c>c (H) and
increasing in c for c<c (H).T a k ea n yp a i r(c0,c 00) such that c0 <c 00.T h e n
(p(c0) − c0)D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − A(c0) − (p(c00) − c0)D(p(c00),A(c00);1) + A(c00) > 0 (A1)
and
(p(c00) − c00)D(p(c00),A(c00);1) − A(c00) − (p(c0) − c00)D(p(c0),A(c0);1) + A(c0) > 0 (A2)
Adding (A2) and (A2) we get
(c00 − c0)(D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − D(p(c00),A(c00);1)) > 0
and it follows that
D(p(c0),A(c0);1) >D (p(c00),A(c00);1) (A3)
Using (A1) we evaluate
π(ϕ(c0);1,H) − π(ϕ(c00);1,H)
=( p(c0) − c(H))D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − A(c0) − (p(c00) − c(H))D(p(c00),A(c00);1) + A(c00)
> (p(c0) − c(H))D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − A(c0) − (p(c00) − c(H))D(p(c00),A(c00);1) + A(c00)
−[(p(c0) − c0)D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − A(c0) − (p(c00) − c0)D(p(c00),A(c00);1) + A(c00)]
=( c0 − c(H))(D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − D(p(c00),A(c00);1))
But, using (A3), we conclude that π(ϕ(c0);1,H) >π (ϕ(c00);1,H) when c(H) <c 0 <c 00,
while π(ϕ(c0);1,H) <π (ϕ(c00);1,H) when c0 <c 00 <c (H).T h i sp r o v e so u rc l a i m .
An exactly analogous argument, which we leave to the reader, establishes that
π(ϕ(c);1,L) is decreasing in c for c>c (L) and increasing in c for c<c (L).
Now, turn to the proposition. Take any (p,A) such that π(p,A;1,L)=ΠM(L)
but which is not on the one-dimensional sub-manifold ϕ(c). Then, using our assumed
boundary conditions and the properties of π(ϕ(c);1,L) just established, there exists one
e c>c (L) such that π(ϕ(e c);1,L)=ΠM(L) and one e e c<c (L) such that π(ϕ(e e c);1,L)=
ΠM(L) . Recalling (3.2) in the text,
π(pM(H),A M(H);1,L)=π(ϕ(c(H));1,L) > ΠM(L)
36it follows that e e c<c (H) < e c.
Further, by construction, we have
(p(e c) − e c)D(p(e c),A(e c);1) − A(e c) − (p − e c)D(p,A;1)+A>0 (A4)
(p(e e c) −e e c)D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) − A(e e c) − (p −e e c)D(p,A;1)+A>0 (A5)
(p − c(L))D(p,A;1)− A − (p(e c) − c(L))D(p(e c),A(e c);1) + A(e c)=0 (A6)
and
(p − c(L))D(p,A;1)− A − (p(e e c) − c(L))D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) + A(e e c)=0 (A7)
Adding (A4) and (A6), we obtain
(c(L) − e c)(D(p(e c),A(e c);1) − D(p,A;1))> 0
and, since e c>c (L), we conclude that D(p,A;1)>D (p(e c),A(e c);1). Similarly, adding
(A5) and (A7), we obtain
(c(L) −e e c)(D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) − D(p,A;1))> 0
and, since e e c<c (L), we conclude that D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) >D (p,A;1). Hence,
D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) >D (p,A;1)>D (p(e c),A(e c);1) (A8)
To eliminate any (p,A) / ∈ {ϕ(e e c),ϕ(e c)}, we want to show that
π(p,A;1,H) < max{π(ϕ(e e c);1,H),π(ϕ(e c);1,H)}
Now,
π(ϕ(e e c);1,H) − π(ϕ(e c);1,H)
= π(ϕ(e e c);1,H) − π(ϕ(e c);1,H) − [π(ϕ(e e c);1,L) − π(ϕ(e c);1,L)]
=( p(e e c) − c(H))D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) − A(e e c) − (p(e c) − c(H))D(p(e c),A(e c);1) + A(e c)
−(p(e e c) − c(L))D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) + A(e e c)+( p(e c) − c(L))D(p(e c),A(e c);1) − A(e c)
=( c(L) − c(H))(D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) − D(p(e c),A(e c);1))
By (A8) we have D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) >D (p(e c),A(e c);1), and it follows that
sign{π(ϕ(e e c);1,H) − π(ϕ(e c);1,H)} = sign{c(L) − c(H)}
We conclude that
max{π(ϕ(e e c);1,H),π(ϕ(e c);1,H)} =
½
π(ϕ(e e c);1,H) if c(L) >c (H)
π(ϕ(e c);1,H) if c(L) <c (H)
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a) c(L) >c (H). Using (A7), we evaluate
π(ϕ(e e c);1,H) − π(p,A;1,H)
= π(ϕ(e e c);1,H) − π(p,A;1,H) − [π(ϕ(e e c);1,L) − π(p,A;1,L)]
=( p(e e c) − c(H))D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) − A(e e c) − (p − c(H))D(p,A;1)+A
−(p(e e c) − c(L))D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) + A(e e c)+( p − c(L))D(p,A;1)− A
=( c(L) − c(H))(D(p(e e c),A(e e c);1) − D(p,A;1))
> 0
where the inequality follows from (A8) and c(L) >c (H). Hence, ϕ(e e c) maximizes
π(p0,A 0;1,H) subject to π(p0,A 0;1,L)=ΠM(L).
b) c(L) <c (H). Using (A6), we evaluate
π(ϕ(e c);1,H) − π(p,A;1,H)
= π(ϕ(e c);1,H) − π(p,A;1,H) − [π(ϕ(e c);1,L) − π(p,A;1,L)]
=( p(e c) − c(H))D(p(e c),A(e c);1) − A(e c) − (p − c(H))D(p,A;1)+A
−(p(e c) − c(L))D(p(e c),A(e c);1) + A(e c)+( p − c(L))D(p,A;1)− A
=( c(L) − c(H))(D(p(e c),A(e c);1) − D(p,A;1))
> 0
where the inequality follows from (A8) and c(L) <c (H). Hence, ϕ(e c) maximizes
π(p0,A 0;1,H) subject to π(p0,A 0;1,L)=ΠM(L).
Combining a) and b) completes the proof of Proposition 1. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Proposition 2 follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1. In the normal
case c(L) <c (H), and the solution to (PH) is at ϕ(e c) for some e c>c (H). ¥
Destabilization of pooling outcomes
We shall concentrate on pure strategy pooling equilibria, while noting that the ar-
guments carry over to any hybrid equilibrium.
Fix some putative pooling equilibrium pair (b p, b A), and suppose that both types of
the ﬁrm play this pair with probability one. It follows that b(b p, b A)=b0,w h e r eb0 < 1
denotes the prior probability assessment that quality is high. Again, we consider the
two cases alluded to above in turn.
a) c(L) >c (H).I fc(L) >c (H), then under our assumed boundary condition there
exists some c00 <c (L) such that
(b p − c(L))D(b p, b A;b0) − b A − (p(c00) − c(L))D(p(c00),A(c00);1) + A(c00)=0 (A9)
38By construction, we also have
(p(c00) − c00)D(p(c00),A(c00);1) − A(c00) − (b p − c00)D(b p, b A;b0)+ b A>0 (A10)
Add (A9) and (A10) to obtain
(c00 − c(L))(D(b p, b A;b0) − D(p(c00),A(c00);1)) > 0
which implies that D(b p, b A;b0) <D (p(c00),A(c00);1).
Evaluate
(b p − c(H))D(b p, b A;b0) − b A − (p(c00) − c(H))D(p(c00),A(c00);1) + A(c00)
Subtract (A9) to obtain
(c(L) − c(H))(D(b p, b A;b0) − D(p(c00),A(c00);1)) < 0
We conclude that the high-quality ﬁrm strictly prefers ϕ(c00) to the putative proﬁle,
provided that b(ϕ(c00)) = 1. By continuity, there exists some price-advertising pair close
to ϕ(c00) (e.g. ϕ(c00− )), which is strictly preferred by type H and strictly non-preferred
by type L to the putative proﬁle, if the associated beliefs are b =1 . Hence, under the
Cho-Kreps (1987) reﬁnement, the pooling proﬁle is destabilized.
b) c(L) <c (H).I fc(L) <c (H), then under our assumed boundary condition, there
exists some c0 >c (L) such that
(b p − c(L))D(b p, b A;b0) − b A − (p(c0) − c(L))D(p(c0),A(c0);1) + A(c0)=0 (A11)
By construction, we also have
(p(c0) − c0)D(p(c0),A(c0);1) − A(c0) − (b p − c0)D(b p, b A;b0)+ b A>0 (A12)
Add (A11) and (A12) to obtain
(c0 − c(L))(D(b p, b A;b0) − D(p(c0),A(c0);1)) > 0
which implies that D(b p, b A;b0) >D (p(c0),A(c0);1).
Evaluate
(b p − c(H))D(b p, b A;b0) − b A − (p(c0) − c(H))D(p(c0),A(c0);1) + A(c0)
Subtract (A11) to obtain
(c(L) − c(H))(D(b p, b A;b0) − D(p(c0),A(c0);1)) < 0
Again, we conclude that the high-quality ﬁrm strictly prefers ϕ(c0) to the putative
proﬁle, provided that b(ϕ(c0)) = 1. Hence, under the Cho-Kreps (1987) reﬁnement, the
pooling proﬁle is destabilized.
Combining a) and b) establishes that no pooling equilibria survive reﬁnement. ¥
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